2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

26 May 2000

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Main Committee I

Summary record of the 6th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 10 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

Chairman	Mr. Reyes Rodriguez	(Colombia)
	later: Mr. Lint (Vice-Chairman)	(Belgium)
	later: Mr. Reyes Rodriguez (Chairman)	(Colombia)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Reimaa** (Finland), speaking also on behalf of Sweden, said that the working paper on nuclear disarmament submitted by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7) was an important contribution to the work of the Committee. It addressed key areas on which the Committee should seek agreement and made proposals that were both ambitious and achievable. The 2000 Review Conference, while reaffirming the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference, should also record the progress achieved in the field of disarmament and identify the areas in which further progress should be sought. The outcome of the Conference should contain clear commitments regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons.

2. His delegation agreed that the Russian Federation and the United States should proceed with reductions of their non-strategic nuclear weapons, as previously announced, in a transparent and irreversible manner. It also supported the goal of achieving the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which should occur no later than the 2005 Conference, and the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Lastly, he agreed that States parties should consider options for dealing with fissile material and endorsed the proposals contained in the working paper regarding increased transparency and accountability and establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc working group for the exchange of information and views on endeavours towards nuclear disarmament.

3. **Ms. Menéndez** (Spain) said that her delegation also supported working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7, particularly the paragraphs on the CTBT, non-strategic nuclear weapons, transparency and accountability, and the Conference on Disarmament. However, it had some reservations concerning the paragraph on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

4. **Mr. Lint** (Belgium) introduced document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.15, which contained a proposal submitted by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Switzerland regarding the wording of part II, paragraph 4, of the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.1). It was important that the four States that were not yet party to the Treaty should attend the meetings of the States parties. He welcomed in that connection the presence of one of those States at the Conference as an observer. His delegation proposed that, in part II, paragraph 4, of the Chairman's working paper, the Conference should ask the President of the Conference and the chairmen of forthcoming sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference to hold informal consultations with the four States not yet party to the Treaty and to report thereon to the respective sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the 2005 Review Conference. During those informal consultations, the President of the Conference and the chairmen of the forthcoming sessions of the Preparatory Committee should submit to those States all documents adopted by the Conference or the Preparatory Committee. The purpose of such an initiative was to send a clear signal that the universality of the Treaty was in the interests of all States.

5. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that those States had surely got the message and that there was no need for the proposed initiative.

6. **Ms. Ho May Yong** (Malaysia) recalled that, at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, her delegation had proposed the establishment of a high-level consultation mechanism with a view to achieving the universality of the Treaty. In the light of the concerns expressed by certain delegations with regard to the integrity of the Treaty, it had decided not to pursue the proposal. The initiative proposed by the representative of Belgium was an alternative approach that Malaysia was ready to support. She noted with satisfaction that her delegation's proposal that the Conference should acknowledge bilateral efforts to promote the universality of the Treaty was reflected in the wording suggested by the representative of Belgium.

7. **Mr. Tawfik** (Egypt) said that his delegation, which was committed to achieving the universality of the Treaty, welcomed the proposal made by the representative of Belgium and would give it due consideration.

8. **The Chairman** invited the Committee to resume its consideration of section B of the revised working paper submitted by him. In informal consultations held the previous day, various delegations had proposed amendments to the original paper. A number of those proposals had been incorporated in the revised working paper contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.1.

9. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) noted with satisfaction that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the revised working paper reflected the language proposed by him in informal consultations for inclusion at the beginning of section B, on the basis of the drafting suggestions submitted by the States of the New Agenda Coalition in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8.

10. **Mr. Lodding** (Sweden) said that there was an inconsistency in paragraph 5, in which the Conference welcomed the ratification of the CTBT by France and the United Kingdom and the recent decision by the Duma of the Russian Federation to ratify the Treaty. As he understood it, the Duma's decision had completed the procedures required for ratification of the Treaty under Russian legislation. The language used should therefore be the same in respect of all three States.

11. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) welcomed the incorporation in section B as paragraph 7 of the language on testing proposed by him in informal consultations on behalf of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria and Peru. That language was among the drafting suggestions submitted by the States of the New Agenda Coalition in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8. During the negotiations on the CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament, four nuclear Powers, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, had made statements that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests would prevent the nuclear-weapon States from developing new nuclear weapons and modernizing their existing stocks. Those statements had been a key factor in convincing the non-nuclear-weapon States to accept the limits imposed on the scope of the CTBT and had formed an integral part of the Treaty's negotiation history. Taking those assurances as their basis, the sponsors of the language now incorporated in paragraph 7 had proposed that the Conference should call upon all States not to conduct tests for the further development and modernization of nuclear weapons.

12. **Ms. Cheunsomchit** (Thailand) said that her delegation supported the wording of paragraph 7.

13. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation was committed to the full implementation of the CTBT. The United Kingdom had both signed and ratified the Treaty. He called on those States that had sponsored the language contained in paragraph 7 of the revised working paper, but had yet to ratify the Treaty to do so at an early date, particularly those States whose ratifications were necessary for the Treaty's entry into force.

14. As stated in the preamble of the CTBT, the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constituted an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The United Kingdom was fully honouring its obligations under the Treaty not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or other nuclear explosion and would continue to do so. However, it would also continue to conduct experiments in order to ensure the continued safety and reliability of its limited nuclear stockpile.

15. The purpose of the Conference was to review the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If the sponsors of the proposal wished to raise concerns regarding the United Kingdom's fulfilment of its obligations under the CTBT, they should do so in the appropriate forums. If, on the other hand, those States were seeking to build on the provisions of the CTBT, they should have submitted a proposal to that effect to the Committee's Subsidiary Body when it began its work. To submit such a proposal at the current stage in the deliberations was neither constructive nor appropriate. His delegation was not prepared to consider constraints that went beyond the United Kingdom's obligations under the CTBT. The Conference should focus instead on bringing about the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty.

16. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom. All stockpile stewardship activities in the United States were conducted in full compliance with the CTBT. The current Conference was not an appropriate forum in

which to reinterpret or expand on the provisions of that instrument.

17. **Mr. Naziri-Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation welcomed the incorporation in the revised working paper of the language proposed by the representative of South Africa in informal consultations. Affirming that the issue of testing was relevant to the Committee's discussions on non-proliferation, he proposed that, in the second line of paragraph 7, the word "any" should be inserted between "conduct" and "tests".

18. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that South Africa, which was among the States whose ratifications were required for the entry into force of the CTBT had ratified the Treaty. He had not submitted his proposal with the intention of reinterpreting the provisions of the CTBT or extending its scope. The language that he had proposed reflected undertakings given by the nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations on the CTBT. In calling upon States not to conduct tests for the further development and modernization of nuclear weapons, the Conference would in no way be restricting the stockpile stewardship activities of the nuclear-weapon States. His delegation was not opposed to such activities, but it did wish to prevent tests allowing for the further development and modernization of nuclear weapons.

19. **Mr. de la Fortelle** (France) said that his delegation fully supported the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom. The Conference's task was to work towards the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT, not to call that instrument into question or to reinterpret its provisions, which was clearly the purpose of the proposal made by the representative of South Africa. The arguments he had put forward in that regard were not convincing.

20. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that the Committee should not continue its consideration of issues relating to the interpretation of the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, but should proceed with the rest of the draft report. His delegation fully associated itself with the comments made by the representative of the United Kingdom.

21. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that the South African proposal did not detract in any way from the priority accorded to the entry into force of the CTBT, which Brazil had signed and ratified. However, it was legitimate for countries to continue to attach importance to other aspects of vertical proliferation. The proposal was not in any way an attempt to reinterpret the articles of that Treaty, and it did not exclude the possible need for tests to be conducted to ensure the safety of existing arsenals.

22. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that he fully agreed with the comments made by the representative of Brazil. There was no question of trying to redefine the CTBT. He could be flexible about suggestions for wording that would make it clear that stockpile stewardship testing did not fall within the ambit of the proposal; however, tests for the further development and modernization of nuclear weapons could not be allowed.

23. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that some representatives seemed to want to reinterpret the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. His delegation would not play that game, which could open a Pandora's box.

24. **Mr. Miranda** (Peru) said that his delegation fully associated itself with the South African proposal, which accorded with his Government's opposition to the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

25. **Mr. Macfhionnbhairr** (Ireland) said that his delegation welcomed the assurances just provided by four of the nuclear-weapon States that they were engaged in no activities which would result in technological alternatives or new types of nuclear weapons. As the representatives of Brazil and South Africa had indicated, the sponsors of the proposal were prepared to consider ways of making the wording of the proposal clearer. He reaffirmed that the issue of safety and reliability was not included in the proposal, and that it was not the intention of his delegation or any other proponent of the proposal to include it.

26. **Mr. Vidricaire** (Canada) said that his delegation would prefer a more focused approach to the task at hand. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was not yet in force, and Canada was one of the 44 States which needed to ratify it. His country, however, had no intention of conducting nuclear tests. Since the South African proposal could not lead to a constructive debate, the Committee should move on with its work.

27. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) said that, if there were nuclear weapons whose safety and reliability were in question, they should be dismantled, not tested. The

goal of the CTBT was to halt the qualitative proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference could not ignore the fact that even though that Treaty had been signed by virtually all the countries whose ratifications were needed for its entry into force, new nuclear weapons of improved design had recently been developed and deployed, giving rise to concern about the qualitative proliferation of nuclear weapons. His delegation felt that the representative of South Africa had expressed that concern in the most moderate terms possible.

28. **Mr. Luck** (Australia) said that his delegation associated itself with the views expressed by the representative of Canada. It was hard not to draw the conclusion from the South African proposal that the CTBT was in some way deficient, and that was not a message that the Conference should be sending to the world. Instead, it should make it clear that the Treaty was still very much part of the non-proliferation regime, and that those States which had not signed it should do so. The Committee should move on to other parts of the revised working paper.

29. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia) said that his delegation supported the South African proposal. The issue of not conducting nuclear tests for the modernization and improvement of nuclear weapons was essential and must be included in the draft report.

30. **Ms. Abulnaga** (Egypt) said that, as one of the sponsors of the proposal put forward by the representative of South Africa, her delegation believed that the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests was one of the most important aspects of non-proliferation. While the South African proposal sought to ensure that States did not undertake any development or testing of nuclear weapons to make qualitative improvements in such weapons, the ultimate objective should be to prohibit all nuclear weapons tests, since there were differing views on the purpose of specific tests. There was no justification for rejecting the South African proposal, which was fully in line with the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

31. **Ms. Ho May Yong** (Malaysia) said that, with regard to paragraph 8, her delegation had proposed that the word "notes" should be changed to "affirms" because the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice was of great historical significance and had a direct bearing on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by States parties and on their policies and obligations in the area of nuclear disarmament.

32. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of the members of the New Agenda Coalition, said that those countries supported the proposal by the representative of Malaysia. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice had been the only significant development in recent years, and the least that the Conference could do was to welcome it.

33. **Ms. Chahin** (Chile), **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia), **Mr. Than** (Myanmar), **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal), **Mr. Randal** (New Zealand), **Mr. Miranda** (Peru), **Mr. Sorreta** (Philippines) **Ms. Cheunsomchit** (Thailand) and **Mr. Le Huy Hoang** (Viet Nam), said that they supported the Malaysian proposal.

34. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that his delegation did not feel that it was appropriate to note or affirm an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the draft report.

35. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation felt that paragraph 8 was unnecessary and fully supported the position expressed by the representative of the United States of America.

36. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would not contest the relevance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to the Committee's work. However, it did not agree that the Committee should affirm that opinion. The Committee could not assume the power to comment on the findings of a legal instance. Therefore, his delegation could not support the Malaysian proposal.

37. **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) said that it was not appropriate to affirm an advisory opinion of a court, which stood in its own right. His delegation, however, was willing to welcome the advisory opinion or take note of it. Turning to paragraph 9 in section B of the Chairman's revised working paper, he said that the last sentence of that paragraph was misleading, because the Conference on Disarmament could have started negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, but had not done so because of the lack of political will. It would be better to make a factual statement, and replace the phrase "could not start" by "has not yet started".

38. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) suggested that the words "could not start" should be replaced by "could not continue" because the ad hoc committee had been

established for a brief period. That would ensure full historical accuracy.

39. **Mr. Shi Zhongjun** (China) said that the Committee should approach the work of the Conference on Disarmament in a balanced and fair manner. While expressing regret that the Conference on Disarmament had not started negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, it should at the same time express regret that the Conference had failed to begin negotiations on the weaponization of outer space, and on nuclear disarmament.

40. **Mr. Luck** (Australia) said his delegation felt that paragraph 9 should focus on the issue of fissile material, which was central to the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", rather than on the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament. Instead of referring to the work carried out in any particular forum, the Committee should concern itself with how far that issue had been addressed.

41. **Mr. Lint** (Belgium) said that he agreed with the comments made by the representatives of Germany and South Africa about paragraph 9.

42. **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) said that his delegation was ready to treat all issues in a balanced and factual manner. There had been a decision in 1995 to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, which should be respected. The Committee could therefore express regret that the Conference had not been able to continue negotiations. Although the Conference had established an ad hoc committee, that committee had not actually started negotiations.

43. **Mr. Macfhionnbhairr** (Ireland) proposed that the last sentence of paragraph 9 should read: "The Conference regrets that negotiations have not been pursued on this issue as recommended in paragraph 4 (b) of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.".

44. **Mr. Shi Zhongjun** (China) said that, if the Committee wanted to be factual, it should be comprehensive. He proposed that the Committee should add the following phrase at the end of paragraph 9: "... due to the fact that some countries are conducting national missile defence systems and that there is a threat of the weaponization of outer space".

45. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that his country's ballistic missile defence system in no way involved the "weaponization" of outer space. Delegations should at least adhere to fact.

46. **Mr. Vidricaire** (Canada) said that delegations should not attempt to score points on issues which were not relevant. The fact was that an immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on the issue had been agreed in 1995, but that following three weeks of negotiations in August 1998, the Conference on Disarmament had not managed to re-establish the ad hoc committee.

47. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that although the original formulation would have been acceptable, his delegation was prepared to support the Irish proposal concerning paragraph 9.

48. **Mr. Luck** (Australia) said that he endorsed the Irish proposal. His delegation could not, however, support language proposed by China since it was interpretative. There were as many opinions on why the negotiations had not been started as there were delegations. The paragraph could not possibly contain them all.

49. **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) and **Mr. Lint** (Belgium) said that their delegations supported the Irish proposal.

50. **Mr. de la Fortelle** (France) said that his delegation was also willing to accept the Irish proposal for the sake of compromise.

51. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) drew attention to the proposal submitted by his delegation in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.14, according to which the following text should also be incorporated in paragraph 10: "It is important to secure these achievements and ensure the irreversibility of this process by preserving strategic stability based on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty". He regretted that the compromise solution proposed by the German delegation at the previous meeting had not met with more support.

52. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America), referring to the second sentence of paragraph 10, said that his delegation favoured deletion of the words "and notes that the Treaty's final implementation is contingent upon approval of the 1997 Protocols relating to START II". Main Committee II had already covered the forward-looking elements. With regard to paragraph 12, he proposed that the operative verb "notes" should

be replaced by "welcomes", which was more appropriate, particularly if the Committee wished to stress the importance of irreversibility.

53. **Mr. Kongstad** (Norway), **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) and **Mr. Yun Byung-se** (Republic of Korea) said that they supported the amendment to paragraph 12 proposed by the United States.

54. **Mr. de la Fortelle** (France) proposed that the words "and disposition" in paragraph 12 should be replaced with the words "disposition and management".

55. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that an alternative formulation for the phrase "defence needs" in paragraph 12 should be devised. "Military requirements" was one possibility.

56. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil), agreeing with the previous speaker on the need to find an alternative formulation, said that the word "requirements" also, however, posed a problem.

57. **Mr. Noboru** (Japan) said that he endorsed the United States proposal, pointing out that Japan was one of the States to which paragraph 12 referred.

58. **Mr. Naziri-Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation wished to reserve the right to return to the question of the operative verbs in paragraphs 11 and 12. In respect of paragraph 11, the use of the word "significant" with regard to unilateral reduction measures was unclear.

59. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) also queried the appropriateness of the word "significant" in paragraph 11. The term was somewhat subjective.

60. **Mr. Reznikov** (Belarus), supported by **Mr. Sartayev** (Kazakhstan), **Mr. Onishchenko** (Ukraine) and **Mr. Noboru** (Japan), proposed that the following text be reincorporated in paragraph 13: "The States parties to the Treaty welcome the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their significant measures in nuclear disarmament, in particular their voluntary decision to withdraw all tactical and strategic weapons from their territories, and take note with satisfaction of the current efforts of those States to strengthen the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security". Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had voluntarily and unconditionally withdrawn all nuclear weapons from their territories, a move which had received the unanimous commendation of the General Assembly.

61. **The Chairman** said that the text had been omitted from the working paper, since it referred to events predating the 1995-2000 review period.

62. **Mr. Reznikov** (Belarus), supported by **Mr. Onishchenko** (Ukraine), maintained that the proposed text did relate to the period under review, since it referred to events in 1996 and 1997.

63. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that the Russian Federation had recently ratified the agreements in question. It was concerned that the other parties should do likewise to ensure their earliest entry into force. Accordingly, he proposed that the following phrase should be added at the end of paragraph 13: "and urges their approval in accordance with appropriate national procedures".

64. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) proposed that in paragraph 14, the references to "paragraph 10" and "1 May 2000" should be deleted, for the sake of clarity.

65. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America), supported by **Mr. Zimonyi** (Hungary) and **Mr. Noboru** (Japan), proposed that in paragraph 14, the operative verb "notes" be replaced by the verb "welcomes".

66. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) said that, in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8, the members of the New Agenda Coalition had proposed that paragraph 14 (formerly paragraph 8) should be deleted. The question of the targeting of States had little bearing on disarmament or nuclear proliferation, since computers could easily be reprogrammed. It was more a question of how computers were managed. Given that the measures taken were thus not irreversible, his delegation could not support use of the operative verb "welcomes". In a spirit of compromise, it would, however, be willing to accept the verb "notes".

67. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) expressed strong support for the amendment to paragraph 14 proposed by the United States. It would be incorrect for the Conference not to welcome the declaration, which was, moreover, the first instrument of its kind.

68. **Mr. Naziri-Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation preferred to retain the operative verb "notes", but wished to reserve the right to return to the issue.

69. **The Chairman** invited the Committee to consider section C of the revised working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.1).

70. **Ms. Aboulnaga** (Egypt), supported by **Mr. Abdelbari** (Algeria) and **Mr. Moushaiti** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), proposed that the word "all" should be inserted before the word "States" in the second line of paragraph 1 to bring the language in line with article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations.

71. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America), supported by **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation), **Mr. Zischg** (Austria), **Mr. Vidricaire** (Canada), and **Ms. Menéndez** (Spain) proposed that paragraph 1 should be deleted since the Charter hardly needed reaffirming.

72. **Mr. Shi Zhongjun** (China) said that paragraph 1 should be retained, since it was closely related to the issue of nuclear disarmament.

73. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico), supported by **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia) and **Mr. Moushaiti** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), said that paragraph 1 was indispensable, since the prohibition of threat or use of force against States provided the legal basis for article VII and was closely related to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

74. **Mr. Abdelbari** (Algeria) said that he endorsed the Mexican position, pointing out the precedent for citing that provision of the Charter in the twelfth preambular paragraph of the Treaty.

75. **Ms. Abulnaga** (Egypt), joining with the previous two speakers, said that she failed to understand how any delegation could possibly object to a reference to the Charter.

76. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) referred delegations to his proposal to amend paragraph 2 as contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.9.

77. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) saw no prospect of negotiating a global legally binding negative security assurances treaty and could not support the use of the Preparatory Committee process for 2005 for that purpose. The Review Conference mechanism was not an acceptable forum for negotiations on that or any other treaty. He did, however, see some merit in the United Kingdom proposal.

78. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) noted that there had been extended discussions on security assurances by the non-nuclear-weapon States, although no definitive conclusion had been reached. Since the language in the proposal by the United Kingdom was extremely vague, he supported the existing text for paragraph 2.

79. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) said that security assurances were extremely important for the New Agenda Coalition. The proposal by the United Kingdom represented a step backwards from the 1995 Principles and Objectives, which set out the possibility of a legally binding international instrument in the area of security assurances. The decisions taken in 1995 should at least be maintained and he therefore supported the current text of paragraph 2.

80. **Ms. Abulnaga** (Egypt) said security assurances were an important issue for her delegation, which had expressed its position as a member of the New Agenda Coalition (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8) and in its own conference paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.12) and its working paper on security assurances (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.1). The language in paragraph 2 was, however, acceptable. The proposal by the United Kingdom, although a laudable attempt to find language acceptable to all delegations, was a step backwards and, like the representative of Mexico, she would have difficulty accepting it.

81. With reference to the declaration by the five nuclear Powers that their nuclear weapons were not targeted at any State, she pointed out that, although some States seemed to believe that that declaration was a form of security assurance for non-nuclear-weapon countries, those weapons could be targeted in a matter of minutes. The steps by the five countries to provide security assurances were insufficient and were, in any case, quickly reversible. The only satisfactory means of providing adequate security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States was a legally binding regime adhered to by the nuclear-weapon States. She, therefore, felt that it was important to retain the existing text of paragraph 2.

82. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that the current wording of paragraph 2 gave rise to certain problems. His delegation's position on security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States was very clear. The work conducted in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances set up in the Conference on Disarmament had been very useful in clarifying the positions of the countries involved. The Russian Federation, therefore, was ready to work just as

constructively as it had in 1998 in that area and favoured continuing that work in the Conference on Disarmament. If delegations had problems with the proposal by the United Kingdom, it would be best to reaffirm the decisions taken in 1995 and call for continuing the work on security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament over the next five years.

83. **Mr. Mya Than** (Myanmar) believed that the current version of paragraph 2 was acceptable and should be retained. Those States which had renounced the nuclear option were entitled to legally binding security assurances in return. He repeated the proposal that he had made in the Committee on 5 May for inserting a new paragraph after paragraph 2 which would reaffirm the 1995 commitments regarding the need for a legally binding international instrument.

84. **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) said his delegation attached great importance to negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and was ready to work to find language acceptable to all delegations. He did not believe, however, that the Conference could direct the Preparatory Committee to develop an instrument for consideration at the 2005 Review Conference. He recalled that Italy had submitted working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/ WP.7 on behalf of Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway, which contained language which might be acceptable to all delegations.

85. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia) stressed the importance of negative security assurances for States which were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other international treaties and non-proliferation regimes. Those States deserved assurances against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. He felt that the current text of paragraph 2 was preferable to that proposed by the United Kingdom and added his support for the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar.

86. **Mr. Naziri-Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) stressed the importance of negative security assurances and believed paragraph 2 should be retained; it would not prejudice the work of the Conference on Disarmament. His country also supported the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar.

87. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that, like the representative of Mexico, he believed the commitments made in 1995 should at least be maintained and, it was hoped, used as a basis for further progress. The current text of paragraph 2 was acceptable, although the corresponding language proposed in the New Agenda Coalition's paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8) or working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7, especially the former, contained language which would be a step forward.

88. The proposal by the United Kingdom, however, was excessively vague and would be a step backward. It seemed paradoxical to welcome the reaffirmation of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to security assurances. The proposal implied that only the nuclear-weapon States would exchange views on positive security assurances.

89. **Mr. Balboni Acqua** (Italy) recalled the proposal made by his delegation in working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7. The legally binding international instrument envisioned by the 1995 Conference would give the NPT greater weight, and negotiations to that end should continue in the Conference on Disarmament in order to link the non-proliferation regime with such assurances.

90. *Mr. Lint (Belgium), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

91. **Mr. Sorreta** (Philippines) said that he supported the current formulation of paragraph 2, although he saw the merits in the proposal by the New Agenda Coalition. He welcomed the spirit of the proposal by the United Kingdom and the comments by the Russian Federation. The proposal by the United Kingdom was, however, somewhat vague. On the other hand, he found the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar quite relevant and regretted that it had not been put forward earlier.

92. **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal) said that negative security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States were an essential incentive for them to renounce the nuclear option in accordance with article II of the NPT. Work on a legally binding instrument to protect those States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be expedited as part of a process leading towards the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which was the only truly effective way of eliminating that threat. He felt that the language of paragraph 2 was acceptable and also supported the proposal by the representative of Myanmar, which was based on the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

93. **Ms. Ho May Yong** (Malaysia) stressed the importance of negative security assurances and expressed her support for the current text of paragraph 2 as well as the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar.

94. **Mr. Le Huy Hoang** (Viet Nam) underscored the need to develop as soon as possible a legally binding international instrument providing nuclear security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation supported the current text of paragraph 2 as well as the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar.

95. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) thanked those delegations which had viewed his delegation's proposal as a basis for compromise and regretted that others saw it as a step backwards. The proposal did reaffirm the 1995 commitments, and he was willing to revise the language to make the text more acceptable. The current language in paragraph 2, however, was unacceptable to his delegation.

96. **Mr. Abdelbari** (Algeria) stressed that a legally binding international instrument on negative security assurances was essential for those States which had decided to renounce nuclear weapons. In that context, therefore, his delegation supported the language of paragraph 2 as well as the proposal by the representative of Myanmar.

97. **Mr. Vidricaire** (Canada) noted the wide range of views on negative security assurances and stressed that some compromise must be found. The proposal put forth in working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7. seemed to be acceptable and had the support of his delegation.

98. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) noted the offer by the representative of the United Kingdom to revise his proposal and said that any new text should be as close as possible to the current wording of paragraph 2 or, perhaps, that proposed in working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7.

99. *Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Colombia) resumed the Chair.*

100. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) welcomed the offer by the representative of the United Kingdom to revise his proposal and agreed that any new text should closely resemble the existing wording of paragraph 2 or the proposal in working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.